The Baltimore Bridge Collapse : Another Case of a Failed Management System ISO 55001:2024

By – Dr. IJ Arora

Can good management systems make organizations immune to disasters? The Baltimore bridge or simply the Bay Bridge or more precisely the Francis Scott Key Bridge that collapsed in 2023 because of the allision with the container vessel MV Dali is a tragedy, perhaps caused by the failure of several management systems, the ship, the port, the state and whoever else was involved.   

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation is ongoing, and will no doubt look at the part played by the MV Dali, its crew and operator. However, my thought is the MV Dali or other ships plying the waters by simple statistical probability were considered as a risk by the authorities. I mean there is the water channel, ships sailing in and out, and a bridge, there was likely to be an allision someday. Perhaps not a matter of if but when! Thus should the bridge have been safer and better designed, based on known and appreciated risks? After all, not all accidents can be completely avoided. However, each tragedy has lessons learnt as responsive action. The lessons become the data that drive risk identification and trends and, thus making the system proactive.  I am sure  the NTSB is considering all this. In the meantime, without going into the ongoing investigation, are there some basics which are common indications of failures of the system. Be it the Titan submersible, or the Boeing management system,  as an SME in  process-based process-based management systems I see a common cause; the failure of the system to  deliver conforming products and services. 

In this short article I want to discuss this bridge collapse in the context of the management system, considering ISO 9001:2015 generically and ISO 55001:2024 Asset Management System requirements specifically. Could simply designing a good system based on the standard have enabled the organization to better assess the associated risks? Perhaps they were assessed and justified as a low probability of occurrence. If that were the case, the discussion would be on prioritization of risks. ISO 55001 was first published in 2014. It was developed as a standalone standard for asset management, building upon the principles of ISO 9001 (quality management) and other relevant standards. 

I am aware that as of September 2024, the investigation into the Baltimore bridge collapse is still ongoing.  Therefore, while the exact cause of the collapse remains under investigation, we can consider several factors that could have contributed to the incident. MV Dali, experienced a series of electrical blackouts before the allision.  The vessel SMS (safety management system based on the ISM Code) implementation could be a factor. Bridge stability, its age and condition are I am sure are being investigated as a potential contributing factor. Then there is always human element.  There may have been errors on the part of the ship’s crew or bridge operators. Was the system designed to support them in such a scenario? What factors may have caused operators at all levels to perhaps not follow requirements, to justify the risks. The NTSB’s investigation will highlight a detailed analysis of the ship’s navigation systems, the bridge’s structural integrity, and the actions of the individuals involved in the reasons for this tragedy. Their final report will provide a comprehensive understanding of the incident and may include recommendations to prevent similar occurrences in the future. 

However, even at this stage we can agree that bridges in general are national assets. They are valuable infrastructure that provides essential services to communities. While it is not publicly known whether the State of Maryland specifically implemented ISO 55001 for its bridges, the principles and practices outlined in this standard could have been beneficial in managing the risks associated with the Baltimore bridge. The implementation of this standard and or even if the generic standard ISO 9001 were implemented the authorities could have performed: 

  • Risk Assessments: ISO 55001 requires organizations to conduct regular risk assessments to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities. A thorough assessment of the bridge’s condition, age, and traffic load could have helped identify potential risks and inform maintenance and repair decisions, as also change in procedures, protection of navigation channels and so on. 
  • Life Cycle Management: The standard emphasizes the importance of managing assets throughout their entire lifecycle, from planning and acquisition to maintenance and disposal. By following ISO 55001, the state could have developed a comprehensive plan for the bridge’s maintenance, upgrades, and eventual replacement. 
  • Performance Measurements: ISO 55001 requires organizations to establish measurable Objectives or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure the effectiveness of their asset management activities. This could have helped the state monitor the bridge’s condition and identify any signs of deterioration. 
  • Continual Improvement: The standard promotes a culture of continual improvement, encouraging organizations to learn from past experiences and make necessary adjustments to their asset management practices. 

I agree, it is impossible to say definitively whether ISO 55001 would have prevented the Baltimore bridge collapse. However, the principles and practices outlined in the standard could have helped to reduce the risk of such incidents. By adopting a systematic and proactive approach to asset management, organizations can improve the reliability and safety of their infrastructure. A systematic study must go beyond what the MV Dali contributed to the Baltimore bridge collapse, it is also important to consider the broader context and the potential contributions of other factors: 

  • Bridge Design and Maintenance: The age and condition of the bridge are likely to be factors in the investigation. Older infrastructure may be more susceptible to damage or failure, especially if it has not been adequately maintained or upgraded. 
  • Vessel Traffic: The frequency and intensity of vessel traffic in the area can also influence the risk of collisions. The bridge is in a busy shipping channel; therefore, the likelihood of incidents was higher. 
  • Safety Measures: The presence or absence of safety measures, such as buoys, warning systems, or restricted areas, can also impact the risk of collisions/allisions. This needs to be studied and are factors the authorities would know. 
  • Human Element and Factors: Errors on the part of both the ship’s crew and bridge operators can contribute to accidents. Factors such as fatigue, inexperience, or inadequate training may play a role. What led to these?  Error proofing, mistake proofing and FMEA (Failure Mode Effect & Analysis) are tools that could be part of the effective management system. 

Let us therefore consider ISO 55001 and the relevant clauses of the standard which could apply to the collapse of the Baltimore Bridge. 

Clause 4: Context of the Organization 

  • Clause 4.1: Understanding the external context, such as the age of the bridge, traffic volume, and environmental factors, is crucial for risk assessment. 
  • Clause 4.2: Identifying the needs and expectations of relevant interested parties, including the public, commuters, and regulatory bodies, is essential for effective asset management. 

Clause 6: Planning 

  • Clause 6.2.1: The bridge’s asset management plan should have included clear objectives for its maintenance, repair, and replacement. 
  • Clause 6.2.2: Specific objectives related to safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness should have been established. 
  • Clause 6.2.3: Detailed planning for maintenance, inspections, and upgrades would have been necessary to ensure the bridge’s structural integrity. 

Clause 7: Support 

  • Clause 7.1: Adequate resources, including funding, personnel, and expertise, should have been allocated for bridge maintenance and inspection. 
  • Clause 7.2: Ensuring that personnel involved in bridge management have the necessary competence and training is essential. 
  • Clause 7.3: Raising awareness among all relevant stakeholders about the importance of bridge maintenance and safety is crucial. 

Clause 8: Operation and Maintenance 

  • Clause 8.1: Regular inspections and monitoring of the bridge’s condition would have helped identify potential problems early on. 
  • Clause 8.2: A well-defined maintenance schedule, including preventive and corrective maintenance, would have been necessary to address issues before they escalated. 

Clause 9: Performance Evaluation 

  • Clause 9.1: Establishing key performance indicators (KPIs) to measure the bridge’s performance, such as safety records, traffic flow, and maintenance costs, would have provided valuable insights. 
  • Clause 9.2: Regular monitoring and evaluation of these KPIs would have helped identify areas for improvement. 

Clause 10: Improvement 

  • Clause 10.2: The bridge’s management should have implemented a system for monitoring and measurement, including data collection and analysis. 
  • Clause 10.3: Predictive maintenance techniques could have been used to identify potential failures before they occurred. 

My objective of writing this article is to awaken this basic thought in organizations that by applying the principles of a standard, be it generic ISO 9001 or an industry specific standard or as in this case the asset management system standard ISO 55001, the organization (State of Maryland) could have strengthened its asset management practices and potentially mitigated the risks associated with the Baltimore bridge collapse. 

The above article was recently published in the Exemplar Global publication – ‘The Auditor’.

Are Medical Audits Improving Systems Or Only Driving Fixes? 

Is there a potential downside to medical audits wherein the audits are focused on finding and fixing problems? A recent discussion with a medical professional piqued my interest in the value of Medical Audits given that QMII, a subject matter expert in auditing, has ventured into the medical auditing field. This led to a conversation with a few additional healthcare professionals to understand a little more about medical audits, their findings and how organizations address them. My additional reading outlined a lack of effective systemic corrective action. In this article, I discuss some aspects of the medical audit process and what organizations can do to improve the process of audits and of implement corrective action.  

There are various types of medical audits including clinical audits, billing/coding audits, financial audits, operational audits and compliance audits. While there are regulations, protocols and standards against which these audits are conducted, in many cases, industry-best practices are also used as audit criteria. This brings subjectivity into the audit as ‘best practices’ knowledge may vary from auditor to auditor based on their experience. Auditing to an auditor’s experience has a major drawback not just in the medical industry but in all industries. It takes the auditors away from requirements which then results in biased inputs to the leadership that may be inaccurate.  This also leaves the auditee (the organization being audited) on the receiving end of findings for which there are no certain requirements. That is, they may make changes to their system based on the finding of one auditor only to find that another auditor objects to the very actions they implemented based on the previous auditor. 

Medical Audits and Recommendations 

In medical audits, it is common practice for auditors to provide recommendations to address findings. These recommendations are based on experience and industry-best practices. In ISO audits this is not allowed. In most industries, including the healthcare industry, there is no obligation to act upon any of the recommendations of an auditor. However, if auditors are perceived to be in a position of authority, then there is an underlying implication that the audit recommendation must be implemented. This is for fear of the nonconformity occurring again only for someone to say, “the auditor told you what to do and no action was taken”. This then also implies, audits do not delve deeply enough to identify systemic weaknesses within the processes or the workflow. 

In speaking with the medical professionals within my professional circle of friends, it was surprising to hear that in many cases the personnel being asked to address the audit findings are unaware of any root cause analysis methodologies nor have they been given any formal training in the subject. Further, they are not clear about what a CAPA is but do know that they need to provide some action to close out the finding. In such cases, is it then fair to expect effective corrective action? Perhaps, the lack of effective corrective actions perpetuated the need for auditor recommendations! 

Without proper training, it is but natural for personnel responding to audit findings to default to the recommendations of the auditor and implement those actions prescribed by the auditor as the corrective action in and of itself. Sadly, in such cases the root cause of the issue goes unaddressed. Sometimes such cases may lie in inadequate resources, technology or even lack of guidance/policy from leaders. While the aim of the audits is to identify where the process may require additional controls, all for providing better healthcare for the patient, the outcome may only be a band-aid. 

What can be done to change this? 

While change may not come overnight, there are a few key steps that can be taken to improve the audit process overall right up until corrective action and meet the end goal of providing better healthcare.  

Auditor training – Auditors must be trained to remain objective through the audit process, to focus on the requirements (criteria) of their audit, to focus on factual evidence and objectively assess it (yes, no experience!). Further they must understand the implications of providing recommendations and thus not provide any recommendations. The auditors are but to focus on assessing the effectiveness of the corrective action plan submitted and verifying the effectiveness of actions taken.  

Root Cause Analysis Training – Healthcare organizations must invest in providing their personnel with training in the different root cause analysis methodologies and how to apply it to identify the root cause(s) of a problem.  

Reinforcing that Recommendations need not be accepted/addressed – Organizations must be professional to build the courage to stand up to auditors and not accept recommendations. Auditors do not know all facets of the process from the short sample of the organization they witness. If their “advice” in the recommendations is wrong/ineffective, who then pays the price? 

Auditor Selection – ISO 19011 provides guidance on the behaviors and skills that an auditor should exhibit, and these are applicable to an auditor selected to conduct any type of audit. Auditors must be evaluated periodically to ensure they are remaining objective through an audit and working to identify the effectiveness of controls and adequacy of resources in assessing if the overall objectives have been met. To learn more about how QMII can support your organization’s audit process, click here. 

–Julius DeSilva, Senior Vice-President

Excellence in Auditing Presented by Dr. IJ Arora for Exemplar Global

“How Auditing Helps Prevent Tragedy,” presented by Dr. IJ Arora with Wendy Edwards (Project Director of Exemplar Global) at the Exemplar Global’s Excellence in Auditing Expo!

Click the link here to understand the critical role auditing plays in averting potential disasters. Whether you’re in risk management, quality assurance, or simply interested in safety and security, this discussion offers valuable perspectives and actionable takeaways.

Link to the Presentation

Can Boeing Ship a Lengthy-Time Period Approach to their 737 MAX Issues?

Dr. IJ Arora

Boeing is within the highlight once more with its 737 MAX planes, that have already had a deeply bothered historical past. Buyer center of attention (which is clause 5.1.2 of ISO 9001 and AS9100) turns out to were misplaced someplace.

I’ve learn a number of contemporary articles on those incidents in addition to Peter Robison’s ebook Flying Blind: The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing, all of which level to a worsening scenario for Boeing. The general public belief of this nice American corporate, which has all the time been dedicated to top-class engineering and depended on merchandise, is converting from one among admire to one among warning. Vacationers are questioning, “Must I fly in a 737 MAX?”

Boeing and the aerospace {industry} normally have excessive requirements for high quality and product protection. On this article, I postulate whether or not an organization’s high quality control machine can ensure that not anything is going fallacious for patrons. Can it make certain perfection? If no longer, what are the choices—and why have one in any respect?

What took place and who’s accountable?

For the ones no longer acquainted with the 737 MAX incident in January, in a while after an Alaska Airways flight departed from Portland, Oregon, a cabin door panel blew off. As investigations are nonetheless ongoing the reasons have no longer but been totally decided. Boeing additionally had a tool factor at the 737 MAX, ensuing within the crash of a Lion Air flight in 2018 and an Ethiopian Airlines flight in 2019.

Right here in the US, the Federal Aviation Management (FAA) performs a vital function in offering laws to make sure flight protection, and likewise supplies oversight of plane producers, airports, and upkeep suppliers. On the subject of the Alaska Airways flight, it kind of feels that the FAA didn’t uphold its depended on function. The FAA’s a large number of assessments and balances, maximum of that are meant to concentrate on buyer protection, had been like aligning holes in slices of Swiss cheese. It’ll be fascinating to peer what adjustments this incident brings about on the FAA. On the other hand, can regulatory oversight ensure protection of flight?

The AS9100 same old, which is restricted to the aerospace {industry}, isn’t the brainchild of a unmarried entity, however fairly a collaborative effort pushed by means of two key gamers:

  1. The World Aerospace High quality Staff (IAQG). This global group brings in combination representatives from aviation, house, and protection firms around the Americas, Asia/Pacific, and Europe. They actively take part in growing, keeping up, and updating the AS9100 same old.
  2. Standardization organizations. Those our bodies, such because the Society of Automobile Engineers (SAE) within the Americas and the Ecu Affiliation of Aerospace Industries (now the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Affiliation of Europe), formally submit and distribute the usual.

You will need to word that AS9100 builds upon the root of the extra normal ISO 9001 high quality control machine same old. Whilst ISO 9001 lays the fundamental framework, the IAQG provides industry-specific necessities a very powerful for making sure protection and high quality within the aerospace area.

Along with the producer and the FAA, the landlord/lessor of the plane additionally performs a task in making sure the aircraft is correctly maintained. This comprises settling on a reliable upkeep supplier, hiring competent engineers, and having powerful processes in position. With such a lot of other stakeholders, can blame be attributed to only one when injuries occur? Moreover, must blame be the secret? Possibly no longer! You will need to word that the machine is applied to toughen every consumer and that each one stakeholders within the worth chain play their phase as effectively.

Audits, inspections, and control methods: Are those the answer?

In the back of each tragedy, casualty, and mishap is a series of comparable occasions. The instant suspect when these kind of vital screw ups happen are deficient inspection protocols, possibly even the feared “human error.” On the other hand, this can be the low-hanging fruit and a deeper dive would possibly establish different causal elements, akin to asking if the standard audit failed.

What’s the distinction between an audit and an inspection? Can they change every different or are inspections by myself sufficient? The straightforward resolution is not any! Each are wanted because of elementary variations in method. Audits take a look at the processes to make sure the control machine produces conforming services and products. An effective control machine should come with the next, to call a couple of:

  • It should be well-defined, beginning with the “as-is” state of the machine.
  • Dangers should be known (clause 6.1) according to the context of the group (clauses 4.1 and four.2).
  • A transparent definition of the product should be known.
  • Efficient audits and periodic evaluation should be undertaken by means of control.
  • Outsourced processes should be managed.

Inspections play the most important function by means of figuring out defects previous to unlock, thus protective no longer most effective the buyer/buyer/consumer/warfighter, and so forth., but in addition the recognition of the group itself. With that stated, inspections don’t give a contribution to power development as a result of they center of attention on fixes versus long-term answers. In impact, they don’t in reality upload worth for the reason that group has already incurred the price of generating the faulty phase or product. The creators of the Toyota Manufacturing Machine (i.e., lean) got here up with the Andon procedure to catch a defect as early within the procedure as imaginable as a way to repair it sooner than the issue went too a ways down the road.

Control methods aren’t only a choice of paperwork. To serve as correctly, they require dedication in any respect ranges of the group, together with height control offering the wanted assets. It takes time to construct a tradition of high quality wherein shortcuts are have shyed away from and there’s no worry of talking up. Buyer center of attention should no longer be compromised. As an example, unlock of conforming product must cross throughout the procedure particularly referred to as out by means of clause 8.6; any interference by means of height control to truncate this procedure would suggest the lack of buyer center of attention. Is that this an opportunity? Possibly, however the investigation should expose the reality. On this case of the Alaska Air incident each the Boeing consumers and Boeing as an organization have suffered. It’s my hope that investigators will establish all failed portions of the machine from every accountable birthday celebration. Those would possibly come with no longer most effective failed inspections, but in addition suboptimal processes. This may finally end up taking us again to an insufficient high quality control machine.

High quality control methods: Can they ship?

Given the above, can a correctly designed and well-audited control machine (supported by means of excellent inspection tactics to assist make certain conforming product) ensure that not anything is going fallacious with a company’s output? My opinion is that no person can ensure this utterly. On the other hand, possibility can indisputably be very much decreased when the entirety is applied effectively. This comprises the educational of team of workers, which correlates strongly to competence; sadly, that is ceaselessly the primary price range to get minimize when assets are scarce.

When high-visibility incidents like those happen, it can be forgotten that airplanes stay the statistically most secure mode of go back and forth on earth. That is essentially because of powerful high quality control methods, well-adopted regulatory frameworks, and common oversight. People play the most important function within the good fortune of the control machine, from the dedication on the height to the buy-in by means of the body of workers (clause 5 to clauses 7.1.3, 7.1.4, and 10.3). Taken in combination, this is helping create an atmosphere the place high quality can flourish inside the group.

Boeing could also be doing so much accurately, and but the consequences may well be unacceptable relying at the efficiency of outsourced processes (clauses 8.41/8.4.2/8.4.3). In spite of everything, the fuselages for the 737 MAX are made by means of Spirit AeroSystems Holdings Inc. Spirit AeroSystems is positioned in Wichita, Kansas; as soon as those fuselages are manufactured, they’re shipped by means of rail to Boeing’s facility in Renton, Washington. Due to this fact, no longer most effective is a significant part of the 737 MAX outsourced, however the delivery and preservation of product (clause 8.5.4) additionally may just give a contribution to the product’s nonconformity. General, Boeing stays chargeable for all the provide chain (clause 4.3), with their legal responsibility to “make certain conformity of its services and products and the enhancement of shopper delight.”

Even with a cast high quality control machine in position, this or identical screw ups can happen. There’s no technique to guarantee the general public of 100-percent acting (i.e., highest) output. The worry within the minds of air vacationers is legitimate and can stay so till an exhaustive root motive research of this factor is carried out and the ones root reasons are resolved. The present occasions beg the query: Did Boeing make stronger their control machine after the Ethiopian Airways 737 MAX crash? If that they had bent to the oars and long gone deep into their evaluation to discover and completely repair the holes of their control machine, this tournament would possibly by no means have happened. Floor corrections, or what some organizations name “repair -it” answers, most effective take away the indications. The foundation reasons should be addressed and resolved (clause 10.2.1). There aren’t any shortcuts to high quality.

In conclusion

It has taken years for air vacationers to really feel protected and unconcerned about air protection. I go back and forth so much the world over, and ceaselessly select an airline according to their carrier and luxury, however now I (in addition to the wider public, I might consider) want to imagine which plane will delivery us. This can be a new worry about product protection that has its genesis in Boeing no longer working its control machine successfully and shedding buyer center of attention. The worst is the erosion of public self assurance in federal oversight and its intent to stay the client protected.

I’ve spent my lifestyles learning identical complicated issues and main groups in serving to organizations in finding long-term sustainable answers. This calls for daring and dynamic management (clauses 5.3 and 5.1) for leaders to plot and enforce alternate. Appreciating and accepting dangers (i.e., protecting the client in center of attention) and transferring ahead is integral to true management. Ethics continues to be no longer a clause of ISO 9001 and AS9100, however moral management is ready doing the proper factor for all stakeholders.

In seminars at which I provide, I ceaselessly ask senior managers: “When you have a decision between following the process and/or doing the proper factor, what would you do as a pace-setter?” The solution—I’m hoping—is to do the proper factor always. However then, hope isn’t a plan. Air protection can’t be according to hope and religion. Boeing wishes the management to revamp their machine if they’re to carry the general public consider again for this nice American corporate.

Concerning the writer

Dr. IJ Arora, Ph.D., is the President and CEO of QMII. He serves as a workforce chief for consulting, advising, auditing, and coaching relating to control methods. He has carried out many lessons for the US Coast Guard and is a well-liked speaker at a number of universities and boards on control methods. Arora is a Grasp Mariner who holds a Ph.D., a grasp’s level, an MBA, and has a 34-year file of accomplishment within the army, mercantile marine, and civilian {industry}.

Hyperlink to the thing characteristic in Exemplar International e-newsletter – “The Auditor”

Controlling Sub-Sea Infrastructure


The recent implosion of the Titan, a sub-sea submersible used for taking elite, high-paying tourists to see the wreck of the Titanic, brought the safety protocols of both vessels into focus. There were no statutory requirements for regulating the Titan and neither were there any when the Titanic sank in 1912! As a reactive measure, the maritime community came up with the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention soon after the sinking of the Titanic. Ironically, after the Titan submersible imploded, we have come to realize there are no requirements covering this vessel. Perhaps with time, the involved counties will react.

The question is, why was nothing done proactively? Tourists go up in hot air balloons all the time. Is there any statutory requirement that these tourist companies must meet? Is there even a requirement to have a management system in place so that these companies work systematically, appreciate the risks in the context of the organization, and plan their operations keeping risks in mind? It is true that entrepreneurs do not like regulations and consider requirements a hindrance in a free business environment. And yet the Titanic, which was declared to be “unsinkable,” did, in fact, sink! In the United States, the domestic towing vessel industry functioned without statutory requirements until recently. The industry avoided regulation, but tragedies occurred, and now the industry is regulated under the U.S. regulatory framework. A process-based management system is the best systematic structure to produce conforming products and services, ensure continual improvement, and implement the statutory requirements if available.

The intent of this article is to proactively start a discussion on the need for regulating sub-sea infrastructure to reduce its affect on the marine transportation system. The phrase “sub-sea infrastructure” refers to equipment and technology placed on or anchored to the ocean floor. This infrastructure may include, but is not limited to, cables for telecommunication, cables for power transmission, pipelines for transmission of fluids, and other stationary equipment for scientific research.

The growth of sub-sea infrastructure is a global phenomenon. As an example, is in the interest of all nations, and particularly here in United States, to promote wind farms, which are a source of renewable energy. When these wind farms are placed in selected geographical locations along the continental shelf, they need sub-sea cables. But are there any laws controlling the systematic development of the industry to enable an effective marine transportation system and its protection of maritime community interests and environmental interests? Is there a central agency responsible for this coordination to allow for a balanced approach to risks? The amount of cabling piling up needs management and oversight.

Sub-sea infrastructure, the definition of the problem

Numerous industries have a stake in sub-sea infrastructure. Examples include oil and gas, telecommunications, fishing, scientific research, and perhaps military/defense applications such as sonar and other arrays and obstacles. This infrastructure is a requirement, but it also faces various challenges including those that can lead to accidents, environmental damage, and possible breaches in national security. All these bring out very significant concerns related to sub-sea infrastructure and the lack of comprehensive and globally accepted standards, requirements, obligations, and assurance mechanisms. It is not that organizations such as the United States Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other federal and state agencies do not look at these issues.

Nevertheless, it remains a concern that there is no single agency or overarching requirement to provide a framework to the industry on harmonized implementation of requirements. This lack of harmonization can mean inconsistencies in design, installation, and maintenance practices which may not address risks uniformly. This can generate consequential risks, leading to increased accidents, mechanical failures, and costs to the industry and the nation.

Recent tragedies and accidents

Recent tragedies and accidents involving sub-sea infrastructure have been limited, and yet must not lead to complacency by the agencies involved. The few that have occurred indicate the challenges and trends pointing to the need for proactive requirements. The recent tragedies include:

  • Deepwater Horizon. The potential consequences and challenges inherent in deep-water oil drilling were brought out by the Deepwater Horizon tragedy in 2010. The oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico caused a massive oil spill and resulted in the loss of 11 lives. Although not technically a sub-sea incident, it highlighted a series of failures in design, maintenance, and company oversight—all factors pointing to the importance of robust safety standards and requirements, and the implementation thereof. The Deepwater Horizon incident was not directly related to sub-sea infrastructure; however, it heightened the risks associated with offshore oil and gas production and the potential for catastrophic environmental damage.
  • Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2. Occurring in September 2022, the damage to these gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea highlighted concerns around sub-sea infrastructure. These pipelines transport natural gas from Russia to Europe; in this incident, they sustained multiple leaks. The exact cause of the damage is unclear, though deliberate sabotage was suspected and is still under investigation. Regardless of the ultimate findings, this incident exposed the vulnerabilities of sub-sea infrastructure to sabotage, and the potential for significant environmental and economic consequences are real. Intentional attacks to the sub-sea infrastructure have the potential for widespread disruption of energy supplies. Apart from the Nord Stream, there have been other sub-sea incidents affecting the gas and oil industry. In 2021 a fire broke out on a sub-sea production control umbilical off the coast of Brazil, causing significant damage to the underwater equipment and resulting in a major oil spill.
  • English Channel Internet Disruption. In 2021, a ship dragging its anchor on the seabed in the English Channel cut the three main internet cables to the Channel Islands. Although this only resulted in slower broadband speeds in this instance, there remains the possibility that it could have resulted in a complete outage.

Looking ahead

These incidents represent leading indicators of a tragedy in the making should proactive action not be taken. The critical importance of safety for sub-sea infrastructure underscores the need for a more comprehensive and rigorous approach to standards and assurance. Industry stakeholders together with regulatory bodies within the United States and global organizations such as the International Maritime Organization must work together to establish a harmonized set of safety standards, implement robust assurance mechanisms, and foster a culture of safety throughout the sub-sea industry.

The increasing reliance on sub-sea infrastructure for various industries (including wind farms) necessitates a proactive approach to safety and risk management. There is definitely a need to invest in research and development to enhance the resilience and monitoring capability of sub-sea infrastructure. The various companies in the sub-sea industry are holding their proprietary information close to the vest. This is understandable. However, these organizations are in competition with totalitarian governments, in which control of business practices is the exclusive dominion of the state. It is necessary to enhance transparency and information-sharing among industry stakeholders to facilitate better risk assessment and incident prevention.

Conclusion

Promoting a culture of safety that prioritizes risk identification, risk mitigation, and continual improvement is essential. There is no common ISO standard for sub-sea management systems. Of course, ISO 9001 is interpretable and can be used as the basis for now. Environmental protection is a challenge for a developing industry, and as such, even greater urgency is needed for statutory requirements encompassing all aspects of stakeholder interests, the marine industry in general, and the protection of the environment for generations to come.

Marine transportation remains the most important way for goods to be shipped across the world, as approximately 80 percent of the world’s goods are transported by ships. Vessels need a place to anchor in normal operating conditions as also in emergencies. A crowded seabed in harbors makes this a challenge for the entire maritime industry.

Without adequate and effective regulatory oversight, it may be too late to take action once cables and other sub-sea equipment have already been laid. Further, multiple agencies regulating the same aspects of the industry can potentially lead to bureaucratic delays.  There is therefore an urgent need to create a single statutory body to regulate the sub-sea infrastructure industry, which will greatly benefit all parties invested in the maritime transportation system.

Exemplar Global Publication “The Auditor”

Looking Ahead at ISO 9001

ISO 9001 has proactively kept up with various industry expectations, over the years, to allow

application by a broad spectrum of industry including the defense forces. The 2015 revision was

a thoughtfully planned giant step. It defined risk (ISO 9001 Clause 6.1) in the context of the

organization (ISO 9001 Clause 4.1 & 4.2) and removed exclusions provision from certification by

redefining what an organization does not do or outsources in the scope (ISO 9001 Clause 4.3). It

also removed preventive action, a reactive concept, and introduced proactive risk appreciation

(Clause 6.1 of ISO 9001 & Clause 8.1 in industry specific standards as AS9100).

This took preventive action from the delayed “Act” stage of the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) stage

to the more logical sensible “Plan” stage. After all, “look before you leap”, as the historical

fundamental, could not be left as a preventive action decision. It had to be at the look – plan

stage! Risk also needed not just mitigation, but also acted as an input, to be used to bring in

innovation in terms of OFI (opportunity for improvement).

These were all positive steps in keeping with technical advancements and computerization and

AI (artificial intelligence) tools. The HLS (high level structure), later updated to HS (harmonized

structure), recognized the need to enable ease of implementation of integrated management

systems. This in turn leading to efficiency, ROI (return on investment) and where applicable

environmental protection, security of the global supply chain, business continuity, cyber

security and health and safety.

The differentiating of knowledge (ISO 9001 Clause 7.6) from competence (ISO 9001 Clause 7.2)

was also a clever needed change. Organizations needed to define their corporate knowledge

aspects and differentiate it from the individual knowledge of personnel. Knowledge and

competence needed merging and a healthy marriage but needed recognition that they were

different. Removal of the reference to Quality Manager (QM) and Quality Manual from the

standard, took away the narrowness of thinking in quality, and brought the clarity to leadership

to remain accountable and to differentiate authority delegation from retaining the

accountability.

I am a member of the TAG-176 group, and yet have not really contributed much to the next

expected changes to ISO 9001. I am sure the TC-176 is working on this. Nevertheless, it is time

to debate and consider updating the standard.

Since the 2015 version was a major fundamental change, I doubt there would be a significant

departure from this 2015 version in the next major update. Unlikely that the next version may

have revolutionary updates. The emphasis, I think would be to clarify and strengthen the

present thoughts in the 2015 version. I would consider the following:

1. Two Standard Concept: I have over the years thought about the two prongs:

manufacturing and service, approach. Both the service and the manufacturing industry

have been using the standard. Some may consider the need for a separate

manufacturing and a service standard as the next step. However, over the years I have

feared too much bureaucracy which the two standards approach brings. I think the two

standard approaches may actually cause more issues than to resolve them. Might I

opine that Clauses under 8.3 for D&D can, if needed, be strengthened, clarified or more

useful notes as applicable to service version incorporated to assist implementers,

consultants and auditors?

2. Risk be better defined and OFI be clarified, to avoid auditors using it as a tool to sneak in

recommendations. OFI is the outcome of considering risk as an input for innovation. It is

not a recommendation.

3. The knowledge clause needs meat to strengthen it, and to better make it inclusive to

systematizing the requirements for organizations to systematize lessons learnt.

4. An annex added to bring clarity and ease to designing and implementing a combined

management system for an organization.

5. Clause 4.3 Scope, in defining scope requires consideration of the context of the

organization, which is based on Clauses 4.1 and 4.2. However, while the scope has to be

available as documented, 4.1 and 4.2 do not require documentation. I would suggest

both clauses 4.1 & 4.2 to have context as a documented requirement.

In conclusion, I think, updating the standard ground up is not a wise idea at this stage. Perhaps

slight tweaking to include some minor changes would give stability in implementation of an

already robust standard.

P-D-C-A with a Christmas Tree


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As a QMII employee, I can sit and observe classes whenever I want, more so since they are virtual instructor led these days. It allows me to get a refresher on the clauses, even though it is so hard to get them. It gets me every time. When the time comes to interview auditees, I smile like a Cheshire cat; not a confident grin but one that hopefully does not betray my nervousness.  Often, I am nervous as a long-tailed cat in a room full of rocking chairs. However, my QMII ISO lead auditor training has prepared me well. I am nervous as the auditee too, even though I know audits are not about pass or fail.  While I call myself a writer and researcher my greatest struggle perhaps lies with Audit Report writing. Oh, man! QMII lead auditor training, however, well prepared me to gather all notes during an audit to present a valuable report to the auditee. Smile.

The aspect of Lead Auditor training I like is the P-D-C-A cycle because I can use that analogy anywhere in my life. I have the responsibility of putting up the tree, however, currently, my application of the P-D-C-A is not going so well. Perhaps a re-plan is needed?

So from the Lead Auditor classes that I have attended, P-D-C-A stands for the following and the task next to it is what I have to do:-

P – Planning: We have to put the tree. Also, the objective of my mission. Considerations include where are the decorations kept, do we have enough, do we need a ladder, what should be the first step, then the next (like testing the lights before we put them on the tree), and more. Most important plan the time to do it in my busy schedule!

D – Do: Now to put my plan into action! Locate the boxes, get them out, unpack, and, get my team to help me even if they don’t want to (just to cheer me on perhaps). Yay! Thanks guys, for your help! Thumbs up for that. Basically, everything else that needs to be completed before the tree is finally up and lit up and everyone is happy. The DO stage can be extremely exhausting. How about that drink to cool me down?

Note – From my Lead Auditor training and also when I am auditing my clients, I know that the ‘DO’ section of the process is where a lot of the “action” happens. Just because “you gotta do it, man, get on with it!” I feel the pain of the “Do’s” as it is easy sometimes to plan but more taxing to put the plan into action. Now getting back to my tree.

C – Check: Once the tree is up and you think the job is over, it is not. You have to wait for the others to “check” the tree out and give their opinions. Pass comments, critique your effort while you are bickering away that they didn’t do anything, but they get to analyze it. What was that? Oh yes, I agree it is just an opportunity for improvement and we love our non-conformities.

A – Act: The verdict is out. The tree looks great. Beautiful decorations. However, the lights seem to flicker at some places, we need better lights for next time. Get more decorations. Good job!

VERDICT

Plan it better next time. Stop bickering when you are doing the job. Be patient and stop being

grumpy when they are “checking” and analyzing your work. Continually Improve this process till you get your Act together – words of a wise Yoda who is enjoying the view of the Christmas tree and listening to the Christmas songs.

Can I get that drink now? Long Island, please. Merry Christmas!

ISO 9001:2015 – Exclusions


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Exclusions to what an organization does were integral to the ISO 9001 standard prior to the 2015 version update. After all an organization cannot do all the work. Clause 7.1.1 lays the foundation on this thought by accepting that an organization must determine and provide resources. In doing so it determines the constraints and capabilities of the existing resources and what needs to be obtained from external providers. As such in previous standards, the organization, when seeking certification, requested exclusion on those processes that it did not perform.

The drawback of this was a major flaw. Over the period of time, some of these organizations, sheltered under the exclusion provision even lost the ability to pick the correct outsourced party! For example, if the organization builds highways, but outsources bridges and tunnels, then it must have the ability to be able to pick the correct vendor/ contractor who will not let the customer down. The revised 2015 version of the standard therefore in the wisdom of TC-176, removed this exclusion provision. It does not imply now the organization cannot outsource what it does not do. All that it means that the organization can review the applicability of the requirements based on its size, complexity and decide on the activities it needs to outsource.

With the exclusion provision removed, the organization would need to do due diligence in appreciating the range of its activities and the risks and opportunities it encounters as also the effect if any of the outsourced vendors not performing to accepted requirements. The organization then remains accountable for the outcome of the outsourced processes and products and services externally obtained. To ensure their consistency and levels of acceptance, it would need to take measures as required by clauses 8.4.1, 8.4.2, and 8.4.3 of the ISO 9001 in enforcing monitoring and measuring to protect its customer and clients.

This assurance that an organization can not and will not outsource those activities which by its decision will not result in failure to achieve conformity of products and services. Clause 4.3 of ISO9001 in determining the scope of the quality management system clearly requires that conformity to the ISO 9001 can only be claimed if the requirements determined as not being applicable do not have an adverse impact on the promises made by the organization. The products it provides, based on externally obtained subproducts or services must not affect customer satisfaction.

In terms of auditing, it is incumbent upon auditors that they carefully seek conformity to this requirement when auditing. Internal audits to ISO 9001 must provide the objective inputs to top management to make better decisions and appreciate the risks of outsourcing to nonperforming and or underperforming outside organizations, remembering they remain accountable and answerable for the final product or service. Ensuring the organization’s accountability for the conforming products and services whether outsourced or not is the responsibility of the organization.

QMII’s ISO 9001 EG (Exemplar Global) certified lead auditor training designed carefully to meet the objectives as envisaged in the standard.